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What is this thing called knowledge? /

Պահպանված է:
Մատենագիտական մանրամասներ
Հիմնական հեղինակ: Pritchard, Duncan
Ձևաչափ: Գիրք
Լեզու:English
Հրապարակվել է: London ; New York : Routledge, 2010.
Հրատարակություն:2nd ed.
Խորագրեր:
Ցուցիչներ: Ավելացրեք ցուցիչ
Չկան պիտակներ, Եղեք առաջինը, ով նշում է այս գրառումը!
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020 |a 9780415552981 (pbk. : alk. paper) 
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020 |a 9780415552967 (hardback : alk. paper) 
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040 |a AM-YEHGA  |c AM-YeHGA 
041 0 |a eng 
100 1 |a Pritchard, Duncan. 
245 1 0 |a What is this thing called knowledge? /  |c Duncan Pritchard. 
250 |a 2nd ed. 
260 |a London ;  |a New York :  |b Routledge,  |c 2010. 
300 |a ix,185 p. ;  |c 26 cm. 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references and index. 
505 0 |a What is knowledge? -- Some preliminaries -- Types of knowledge -- Two basic requirements on knowledge : truth and belief -- Knowing versus merely getting it right -- A brief remark on truth -- The value of knowledge -- Why care about knowledge? -- The instrumental value of true belief -- The value of knowledge -- The statues of Daedalus -- Is some knowledge intrinsically valuable? -- Defining knowledge -- The problem of the criterion -- Methodism and particularism -- Knowledge as justifed true belief -- Gettier cases -- Responding to the gettier cases -- Back to the problem of the criterion -- The structure of knowledge -- Knowledge and justification -- The enigmatic nature of justification -- Agrippa's trilemma -- Infinitism -- Coherentism -- Foundationalism -- Rationality -- Rationality, justification, and knowledge -- Epistemic rationality and the goal of truth -- The goal(s) of epistemic rationality -- The (un)importance of epistemic rationality -- Rationality and responsibility -- Epistemic internalism/externalism -- Virtues and faculties -- Reliabilism -- A gettier problem for reliabilism -- Virtue epistemology -- Virtue epistemology and the externalism/internalism distinction -- Where does knowledge come from? -- Perception -- The problem of perceptual knowledge -- Indirect realism -- Idealism -- Transcendental idealism -- Direct realism -- Testimony and memory -- The problem of testimonial knowledge -- Reductionism -- Credulism -- The problem of memorial knowledge -- A priority and inference -- A priori and empirical knowledge -- The interdependence of A priori and empirical knowledge -- Introspective knowledge -- Deduction -- Induction -- Abduction -- The problem of induction -- The problem of induction -- Responding to the problem of induction -- Living with the problem of induction I : falsification -- Living with the problem of induction II : pragmatism -- A case study : moral knowledge -- The problem of moral knowledge -- Scepticism about moral facts -- Scepticism about moral knowledge -- The nature of moral knowledge (I) : classical foundationalism -- The nature of moral knowledge (II) : alternative conceptions -- Do we know anything at all? -- Scepticism about other minds -- The problem of other minds -- The argument from analogy -- A problem for the argument from analogy -- Two versions of the problem of other minds -- Perceiving someone else's mind -- Radical scepticism -- The radical sceptical paradox -- Scepticism and closure -- Mooreanism -- Contextualism -- Truth and objectivity -- Objectivity, anti-realism, and scepticism -- Truth as the goal of inquiry -- Authenticity and the value of truth -- Relativism. 
650 0 |a Knowledge, Theory of. 
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